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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This appeal addresses (1) the procedure a would-be candidate for 
the Legislature must follow in District Court to overturn the Secretary of State's denial of his 
request to appear on the ballot, and (2) if mootness and/or procedural issues are not dispositive, 
the substantive grounds upon which a would-be candidate can be denied a place on the ballot. 
Statement of Facts. On March 12, 2014, Plaintiff-Appellant Caleb Hansen submitted a 
Declaration of Independent Candidacy for State Representative, Seat B, Legislative District 19, 
for the general election of November 4, 2014, to the Office of Respondent-Defendant Secretary 
of State Ben Ysursa. 1 R., pp. 3, 55. Later that same day, Chief Deputy Secretary of State 
Timothy A. Hurst sent Mr. Hansen a letter informing Mr. Hansen that ( 1) he would not be on the 
ballot because he had not been a qualified elector in District 19 for a year preceding the general 
election, and (2) he had a right under Idaho Code § 34-215 to appeal the decision to deny him a 
place on the ballot. The body of that letter said: 
Article III, section 6 of the Idaho Constitution lays out the 
qualifications of an individual to serve as a member of the Idaho 
legislature. It says: 
"No person shall be a senator or representative who, at the 
time of his election, is not a citizen of the United States, 
and an elector of this state, nor anyone who has not been 
for one year next preceding his election an elector of the 
county or district whence he may be chosen." 
The Constitution, in Article VI Section 2, also defines an 
elector. Again, it says: 
"Every male or female citizen of the United States, eight-
Mr. Ysursa did not run for re-election in 2014. Lawerence Denney was elected Secretary of State 
in the general election of 2014 and is scheduled to take office on January 5, 2015. Pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 7, Mr. Denney will be substituted as a party for Mr. Y sursa once he takes office. 
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een years old, who has resided in this state, and the county 
are [ where J he or she offers to vote for the period of time 
provided by law, if registered as provided by law, 1s a 
qualified elector." 
According to the voter registration records of the State, you 
would not meet the qualifications to be an Idaho Legislator this 
year. Your name will, therefore, not appear on the primary 
election2 ballot. Enclosed is a letter from the Attorney General 
issued in 1998 addressing this issue. Your petitions are being 
returned as of this date. 
If you disagree with this decision Idaho Code section 34-
215 provides that you may appeal to the District Court for 
remedy. 
R., pp. 10, 18, 49 ( emphasis added). The 1998 letter from the Attorney General's Office that was 
enclosed with the letter quoted above contained a legal analysis concluding that candidates for 
the Legislature must have been qualified electors (i.e., registered voters) in their district for a 
year before the general election. R., pp 11-13, 19-21, 50-52. 
Mr. Hansen was not registered to vote in District 19 for one year before the general 
election of 2014. Indeed, Mr. Hansen registered to vote in District 19 on March 11, 2014, the 
day before he presented his candidacy papers to the Secretary of State. R., pp. 56-57 (Verified 
Answer, 15), 61-64 (voter registration records). 
Although the Chief Deputy Secretary of State's letter informed Mr. Hansen of his right of 
appeal under Idaho Code § 34-215, Mr. Hansen did not promptly file an appeal. Instead, he 
wrote a letter dated March 18, 2014, to the Attorney General, which contended that the analyses 
of the Offices of the Secretary of State and of the Attorney General were in error. R., pp. 22-24. 
By a letter dated March 19, 2014, Constituent Information Specialist Kriss Bivens Cloyd of the 
2 The letter's reference to the "primary election" ballot was in error. As an independent candidate, 
Mr. Hansen was seeking a place on the general election ballot. See Idaho Code § 34-708, in particular 
subsection ( 4) (qualified independent candidates shall be placed on the general election ballot). 
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Attorney General's Office told Mr. Hansen that the Attorney General could not provide the legal 
guidance that Mr. Hansen was seeking. R., p. 25. 
Mr. Hansen's Appellant's Brief states that he "worked diligently to identify and exhaust 
any informal, administrative, and otherwise non-judicial means to resolve the issue," including 
"a discussion on April 1st 2014 with Kriss Bivens Cloyd." App.Br., p. 5. His Affidavit does not 
state when that discussion took place, R., p. 16, and he does not explain in his Brief or Affidavit 
why he had further discussion with Ms. Bivens Cloyd thirteen days after her letter to him. 
Course of the Proceedings. On April 18, 2014, thirty-seven days after the Chief Deputy 
Secretary of State's letter informing Mr. Hansen that he would not be on the ballot and that he 
had a right of appeal under Idaho Code § 34-215, Mr. Hansen filed an Application for a Writ of 
Mandamus in District Court. R., pp. 3-14. The Application stated that Mr. Hansen was entitled 
to a Writ of Mandamus because he had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. R., p. 3. 
The Application asked the District Court to "speedily issue a Writ of Mandate compelling the 
Secretary of State to certify the Applicant's candidacy and include the name 'Caleb Hansen' on 
the November 4th 2014 general election ballot as an unaffiliated candidate for State Representa-
tive District 19 Seat B." R., p. 8. 
The Secretary of State moved to dismiss the Application, arguing that no Writ should 
issue when Mr. Hansen had, but did not pursue, a right of appeal under Idaho Code§ 34-215. R., 
pp. 30-34. Alternatively, if the Application for a Writ were treated as an appeal to the District 
Court under § 34-215, the Secretary of State argued that the appeal should be dismissed as 
untimely because it was not taken within Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(b )'s twenty-eight-day 
deadline for appeal following the decision to be appealed. R., pp. 35-36. 
The Secretary of State noticed a hearing for his Motion to Dismiss to be argued on May 
14, 2014. R., pp. 38-39. Mr. Hansen then noticed a hearing for his Application for a Writ of 
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Mandamus to be argued the same day. R., p. 41. In response to Mr. Hansen's notice, the 
Secretary of State filed a Verified Answer, an Affidavit, and a Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Application that preserved his arguments for the Motion to Dismiss; he also made fallback legal 
arguments and presented additional facts for the District Court to consider if the Motion to 
Dismiss were denied and the Application for a Writ were taken up at hearing. R., pp. 54-82. 
The District Court heard argument on May 14, 2014, and granted the Motion to Dismiss 
from the bench. Tr., pp. 30-39. The District Court's Order and Judgment granting the Motion to 
Dismiss was filed with the Clerk of the District Court on May 28, 2014. It provided: 
IT IS THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT of this Court that: 
The Application for a Writ of Mandamus is DENIED; and 
Treating the Application for a Writ of Mandamus as an ap-
peal pursuant to Idaho Code § 34-215, the Appeal is DISMISSED 
for lack of jurisdiction as untimely filed. 
This is a FINAL JUDGMENT on all issues in this case 
from which an appeal may taken as provided by the Idaho Appel-
late Rules. 
R., pp. 83-84.3 Mr. Hansen timely appealed on July 8, 2014, forty-one days after Judgment was 
filed with the Clerk. R., pp. 85-87. 
3 The District Court's Order and Judgment preceded the adoption of the current version of Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a), which became effective July 1, 2014. Rule 54(a) now requires judgments 
to begin with the words: "JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: .... " 
The words used by the District Court in the first paragraph of the judgment above are similar in 
concept to the current requirement of Rule 54(a), but are not identical. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This appeal presents the following issues: 
(1) Mootness. (a) Is the appeal from the District Court moot and subject to dismissal 
because no relief can now be provided regarding the general election of November 4, 2014?, or 
(b) should the appeal be decided under one or more exceptions to the mootness rule, i.e.: 
(i) the appeal presents issues capable of repetition but evading review, and/or 
(ii) the appeal presents issues of substantial public importance? 
(2) Procedure -Appeal and Mandamus. If the appeal is not dismissed as moot, 
(a) did Mr. Hansen timely appeal the Secretary of State's denial of a place on the ballot?, 
(b) was he exhausting administrative remedies and entitled to additional time for appeal 
when he contacted the Office of the Attorney General?, and/ or 
( c) may he seek a rvrit of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to place him on the 
ballot if he did not timely appeal from the Secretary of State's decision? 
(3) Qualifications for the Ballot. If the preceding issues are not dispositive, must a 
would-be candidate for State Legislature be a registered voter for at least one year before the 
general election in the district in which he seeks office in order to qualify for the ballot? 
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL 
The Secretary of State does not seek attorneys' fees on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Issues on Appeal Are Moot, But Are Capable of Repetition and 
Evading Review and/or Are of Substantial Public Importance, So the 
Appeal Should Not Be Dismissed as .Moot 
The Appellant's Brief does not discuss mootness. The general election of November 4, 
2014, is over; thus, Mr. Hansen's claim of a right to appear on that ballot for that election is 
moot. The general rule is that the Court dismisses moot issues: 
This Court may dismiss an appeal when ... the case in-
volves only a moot question. A case becomes moot when the 
issues presented are no longer live .... A case is moot if it presents 
no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no 
practical effect upon the outcome. 
Stephen v. Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd, 150 Idaho 521, 528, 248 P.3d 1256, 1263 (2011) (citations 
omitted). However, moot issues need not be dismissed 
(1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences 
imposed on the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged 
conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of 
repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of 
substantial public interest. 
Stephen, 150 Idaho at 528, 248 P.3d at 1263 (citation and internal punctuation omitted). As 
explained in Parts I.A and LB of this argument, pp. 6-10, the second and third of Idaho's three 
exceptions to the general rule for dismissal of moot appeals apply here. Thus, the Court may rule 
on the moot issues presented by this appeal. 
A. Ballot Disqualification Is Capable of Repetition But Evading Review 
There are two parts to the second exception to the mootness doctrine: (1) The issue is 
capable of repetition, and (2) the issue evades review. Both are present here. 
First, the issue of disqualification of would-be Legislative candidates for failure to be a 
qualified elector (registered voter) in the candidate's Legislative District for a year before the 
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general election is recurring. Affidavit of Secretary of State Y sursa (twelve candidates have been 
similarly disqualified in the 2006-2014 election cycles). R., p. 67. Likewise, issues of the proper 
procedure to challenge the Secretary of State's disqualification of a candidate from the ballot are 
recurring. E.g., Yost v. Ysursa, Supreme Court Docket No. 35234 (2008) (application for original 
'\Nrit in Supreme Court to be placed on the ballot denied) (no published decision). 
Second, recurring election issues evade appellate review. Would-be candidates cannot be 
disqualified before filing their candidacy papers with the Secretary of State; ballot qualification 
issues become moot upon creation of the ballot. As explained below, the period from filing to 
creation of the general election ballot is at most about 6½ months and in this case was 179 days. 
Primary elections are held on the third Tuesday of May in even numbered years. Idaho 
Code§ 34-601(1). Candidates for State Senator and State Representative must file Declarations 
of Candidacy during a two-business-week period beginning the twelfth Monday before the pri-
mary election and ending the tenth Friday before the election. Idaho Code § 34-704 (timelines 
for party candidates to file for primary election), § 34-708 (independent candidates have same 
timelines ). Under these statutes, May 15 is the earliest date on which a primary election can be 
held; February 26 (or February 27 in leap years) is the earliest date for filing Declarations of 
Candidacy in such a year. May 21 is the latest date on which a primary election can be held; 
March 15 is the latest date for filing in such a year. Thus, a Declaration of Candidacy could be 
filed as early as February 26 or as late as March 15. 
General elections for State Senator and State Representative are held on the first Tuesday 
after the first Monday in November in even numbered years. Idaho Code § 34-601(2) (date of 
general election); § 34-614 (State Senators and State Representatives run in general election). 
The Secretary of State must prepare sample ballots for the county clerks by September 7. Idaho 
Code§ 34-903 (Secretary of State to prepare sample ballots), § 34-909 (deadline for preparation 
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of sample ballots). Sample ballots are prepared long in advance of the general election because 
ballots must be available for absentee military voting 45 days before the election. Idaho Code 
§ 34-1002; 42 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8) (formerly § 1973ff-2) (military absentee ballots must be 
mailed at least 45 days before election if requested more than 45 days before election). 
It is 193 days from February 26 (the earliest possible day to file a Declaration of Candi-
dacy for Legislative office) to September 7 (the deadline for preparing sample ballots). It is 176 
days from March 15 (the latest possible day to file) to September 7.4 Thus, whether the issues in 
this appeal are (1) the proper procedure to challenge the Secretary of State's denial of a place on 
the ballot, or (2) the grounds upon which a would-be candidate for the Legislature may be denied 
a place on the ballot, the Court may rely on its own experience to conclude that 176 to 193 days 
is insufficient time for first the District Court, then the Supreme Court, to review the Secretary of 
State's decision and that these issues are capable of repetition but evading appellate review. 
Thus, this exception to the mootness rule applies.5 
B. Election Issues Are of Substantial Public Importance 
Several sections of the Idaho Constitution address qualifications for office,6 and Article 
4 In 2014 the primary election was held on Tuesday, May 20, 2014. The first date for candidate 
filing was Monday, March 3, 2014; the last date was Friday, March 14, 2014. It was 179 days from the 
Chief Deputy Secretary of State's March 12, 2014 letter to Mr. Hansen until September 7, 2014 
5 If a would-be candidate is denied a place on the primary election ballot, the time line would of 
course be much more compressed because the primary election is held in May. 
6 Article III, § 6, provides the following qualifications for Senators and Representatives: 
§ 6. Qualifications of members. - No person shall be a senator or representative 
who ... is not a citizen of the United States, and an elector of this state, nor anyone who has 
not been for one year next preceding his election an elector of the county or district whence 
he may be chosen. 
Article IV, § 3, includes many qualifications for constitutional executive offices: 
§ 3. Qualifications of officers. - No person shall be eligible to the office of gov-
ernor or lieutenant governor unless he shall have attained the age of thirty years at the time 
of his election; nor to the office of secretary of state, state controller, or state treasurer, un-
less he shall have attained the age of twenty-five years; nor to the office of attorney general 
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VI of the Idaho Constitution is devoted exclusively to elections and suffrage. The prominence of 
these issues in the Constitution shows their substantial public importance. Further, case law has 
long noted the importance of election-related issues. E.g., Weldon v. Bonner County Tax Coali-
tion, 124 Idaho 31, 37, 855 P.2d 868, 874 (1993), rev'd on other grounds, City of Boise City v. 
Keep the Commandments Coalition, 14 3 Idaho 254, 141 P.3d 1123 (2006) ( critical issue of scope 
of referendum and initiative power taken up because it presented important undecided issue of 
law); Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423,429, 195 P.2d 662,664 (1948) (would-be candidate's claim 
of right to appear on the ballot taken up because it was important issue). These authorities show 
the public importance of issues regarding qualifications for office and of elections in general. 
The public importance exception to mootness also applies. 
unless he shall have attained the age of thirty years, and have been admitted to practice in the 
Supreme Court ... of Idaho, and be in good standing at the time of his election. In addition 
. . . each of the officers named shall be a citizen of the United States and shall have resided 
within the state ... two years next preceding his election. 
Article V, § 18, provides the following qualifications for Prosecuting Attorneys: 
§ 18. Prosecuting attorneys Term of office - Qualifications. - A prosecuting 
attorney ... shall be a practicing attorney at law, and a resident and elector of the county for 
which he is elected. . .. 
Article V, § 23, provides the following qualifications for district judges: 
§ 23. Qualifications of district judges. - No person shall be eligible to the office of 
district judge unless he be learned in the law, thirty years of age, and a citizen of the United 
States, and shall have resided in the state . . . at least two years next preceding his election, 
nor Wlless he shall have been at the time of his election, an elector in the judicial district for 
which he is elected. 
Mr. Hansen laments that with Idaho's same-day voter registration "[He], and likely the majority of 
Idaho's qualified electors, never heard or imagined that there are rights that could be forfeited due to 
technicalities regarding voter registration even if the right and ability to vote was never impeded." App. 
Br., p. 9. The sections excerpted above show that what Mr. Hansen calls "technicalities" for holding 
office were important to the Delegates to the Idaho Constitutional Convention; they required more civic 
engagement with one's own community to run for office than they did to vote. 
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II. Idaho Code § 34-215 Provided a Plain, Speedy and Adequate Remedy 
at Law From Ballot Disqualification; Mandamus Was Not Available When 
No Timely Appeal Was Filed 
This section of the brief first examines in tum the law of appeals to the District Court, of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies, and of mandamus. 
A. Appeals from the Secretary of State to the District Court Must Be Timely Filed; the 
District Court Properly Dismissed the Appeal as Untimely 
Idaho Code § 34-215 provides a right of appeal to District Court from the Secretary of 
State's disqualification of a would-be candidate from the ballot: 
34-215. Appeals by aggrieved persons. - (1) Any per-
son adversely affected by any act or failure to act by the secretary 
of state ... under any election law, or by any order ... directive or 
instruction made under the authority of the secretary of state ... 
under any election law, may appeal therefrom to the district court 
( 4) The remedy provided in this section is cumulative and 
does not exclude any other remedy provided by law against any act 
or failure to act by the secretary of state ... under any election law 
or against any order ... directive or instruction made under the 
authority of the secretary of state ... under any election law. 
No section in Title 34 provides a deadline for appeal under § 34-215. There are two 
"default" provisions of law with deadlines for appeal from executive action when the appeal 
statute is silent: (1) Idaho Code § 67-5273,7 the section of the Administrative Procedure Act 
7 Idaho Code§ 67-5273 provides: 
§ 67-5273. Time for filing petition for review. - (1) A petition for judicial review 
of a temporary or final rule may be filed at any time .... 
(2) A petition for judicial review of a final order ... must be filed within twenty-eight 
(28) days of the service date of the final order ... , or, if reconsideration is sought, within 
twenty-eight (28) days after the service date of the decision thereon .... 
(3) A petition for judicial review of a final agency action other than a rule or order 
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(APA) with deadlines for judicial review of agency actions under the APA, and (2) Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 84(b ), 8 which applies when no statute prescribes a different appeal period. The 
Court need not decide which of these catch-all provisions governs here because they both 
provide the same answer: The twenty-eight-day time for appeal began to run on March 12, 2014, 
when the Chief Deputy Secretary of State notified Mr. Hansen in writing that he would not be on 
the ballot and could appeal under§ 34-215; the appeal time expired four weeks later on April 9, 
2014. Mr. Hansen did not file in District Court until nine days later, on April 18, 2014. R., p. 1. 
Thus, the District Court's dismissal of the appeal as untimely should be affirmed. 
B. Contacts with the Office of the Attorney General Did Not Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies and Did Not Delay the Time for Appeal 
Mr. Hansen argues that § 67-5273(3) applies to his appeal and that it extended the time 
for appeal while he was pursuing administrative remedies. App.Br., pp. 5-6, 15. He contends 
that his discussions with the Attorney General's Office were an attempt to exhaust administrative 
8 
must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the agency action, except as provided by other 
provision of law. The time for filing a petition for review shall be extended during the pen-
dency of the petitioner's timely attempts to exhaust administrative remedies, if the attempts 
are clearly not frivolous or repetitious. . .. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(b) provides: 
84(b). Filing Petition for Judicial Review. 
( 1) Unless a different time or procedure is prescribed by statute, a petition for judicial 
review from an agency to district court must be filed with the appropriate district court with-
in twenty-eight (28) days after the agency action is ripe for judicial review under the statute 
authorizing judicial review, but the time for filing a petition for judicial review is extended 
as provided in the next sentence. When the decision to be reviewed is issued by an agency 
with authority to reconsider its decision, the running of the time for petition for judicial re-
view is suspended by a timely motion for reconsideration .... Judicial review is commenced 
by filing a petition for judicial review with the district court... . . .. 
Mr. Hansen says without any citation of authority that "the Secretary of State has authority to 
reconsider the decisions of his office,", 4, App.Br., p. 19, so Mr. Hansen was entitled to Rule 84(b)'s 
provisions regarding reconsideration and tolling. App.Br., p. 19. However, Mr. Hansen did not file any 
formal motion for reconsideration with the Secretary of State, so there was no tolling under Rule 84(b )' s 
reconsideration provision. 
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remedies. App. Br., pp. 5-6, 10-11, 15-20. They were not. 
Mr. Hansen's argument fails because it was the Secretary of State's decision that he 
appealed, not the Attorney General's. No statute gives the Attorney General remedial authority 
over the Secretary of State's decisions. Section 67-5273(3) is not explicit that the administrative 
remedies that must be exhausted are remedies before the officer or agency whose decision will 
be reviewed by the District Court, but that proposition is implicit. The purpose of exhaustion is 
to allow the agency or officer that made the decision to review (and if necessary correct) its 
decision as provided by statute, not to persuade a second officer or agency to overrule the first, 
and the case law refers to remedies before the agency that made the decision, not remedies 
before other agencies or officers: 
Before a court will hear an appeal from an agency adjudica-
tion, a litigant must normally exhaust the administrative remedies 
that agency makes available. If an administrative remedy is pro-
vided by statute, relief must first be sought by exhausting such 
remedies before the courts will act. . . . The purpose of this rule is 
simple; it provides the administrative body with the opportunity to 
mitigate or cure personnel grievances without judicial intervention. 
Nation v. State, Department of Correction, 144 Idaho 177, 193, 158 P.3d 953, 969 (2007) (em-
phasis added) ( citations and internal punctuation omitted). The Secretary of State knows of no 
cases permitting exhaustion of administrative remedies before an officer or agency other than the 
one making the decision when the second officer or agency has no right to overturn the first. 
Petersen v. Franklin County, 130 Idaho 176, 938 P.2d 214 (1997), cited App.Br., pp. 15-
16, does not apply here. In that case the Petersens attempted to exhaust administrative remedies 
before the county commissioners (the decision makers); the commissioners did not indicate that 
they had made a final decision and that the Petersens had exhausted their administrative remedies 
until well after the decision at issue was made. This Court held that the time for petitioning for 
judicial review did not being to run until the Petersons were informed that they had exhausted 
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their administrative remedies. 130 Idaho at 185, 938 P.2d at 1223. In this case, however, the 
Chief Deputy Secretary of State informed Mr. Hansen of his right of appeal from the start, and 
statute did not provide any administrative remedies for Mr. Hansen to exhaust. 
Moreover, even if Mr. Hansen's attempt to persuade the Attorney General to overrule the 
Secretary of State were to be considered an exhaustion of administrative remedies ( even though 
there was no such statutory remedy), the Office of the Attorney General declined to enter the fray 
in a letter dated March 19, 2014. Mr. Hansen filed more than twenty-eight days after that, on 
April 18, 2014. He was untimely no matter how one counts. 
Mr. Hansen also contends that he should not be "punished for first attempting to resolve 
the issue through administrative, informal, and non-judicial means as statute requires," App.Br., 
p. 19, citing Idaho Code§ 67-5241(1)(c), a subsection of the APA which states that "(1) Unless 
prohibited by other provisions of law: ... [1] (c) informal disposition may be made of any 
contested case by negotiation, stipulation, agreed settlement, or consent order. Informal settle-
ment of matters is to be encouraged." Section 67-524l(l)(c) does not apply here; it is part of the 
contested case hearing sections of the APA, but statute does not provide for a contested case 
hearing for ballot eligibility. Instead, statute provides for appeal to District Court. 
Under Article V, § 20, of the Idaho Constitution, the District Court's appellate jurisdiction 
is purely statutory. "§ 20. Jurisdiction of the district court. - The district court shall have 
original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as 
may be conferred by law." Emphasis added. Filing a timely appeal is therefore jurisdictional. 
Chavez v. Canyon County, 152 Idaho 297, 303, 271 P.3d 695, 701 (2012) (district court had no 
jurisdiction to hear untimely appeal); Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 133, 139 P.3d 
732, 735 (2006) (same). Mr. Hansen filed his application for a writ on April 18, 2014, nine days 
after the time to appeal expired. Accordingly, the District Court had no jurisdiction to hear an 
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appeal from Mr. Hansen if his Application for a writ is considered an appeal. See also Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 84(n) (failure to file an appeal "within the time limits prescribed by 
statute and these rules shall be jurisdictional and shall cause automatic dismissal ... upon motion 
of any party, or upon initiative of the district court"). The District Court's dismissal of Mr. 
Hansen's application as an untimely appeal, if it were an appeal, should be affirmed. 
C. Mandamus Is Not Available Following a Missed Appellate Deadline 
The statutes governing mandamus provide that it is available when there is no plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy at law: 
§ 7-302. \Vhen and by what courts issued. - It [a writ 
of mandamus] may be issued by ... any district court to any in-
ferior tribunal, ... board or person, to compel the performance of 
an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an 
office ... ; or to compel the admission of a party to the use and the 
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled, and from 
which he is unlawfully precluded .... 
§ 7-303. Absence of adequate remedy. - The writ must 
be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy and ade-
quate remedy in the ordinary course of law. . .. 
These statutes have been interpreted from the earliest days of Statehood forward to preclude 
issuance of a writ of mandamus ( or its counterpart the writ of prohibition, see Idaho Code § 7-
401) when a right of appeal is available. Wilterding v. Green, 4 Idaho 773, 786-777, 45 P. 134, 
138 (1896) (mandamus is not available when statute provides a complete remedy); Ackerman v. 
Bonneville County, 140 Idaho 307, 311, 92 P.3d 557, 561 (Ct.App. 2004) (when there was "a 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the normal course of law, because the denial of the 
motions ... could be appealed directly ... we affirm the district court's decision not to issue a 
writ of prohibition on this basis"). The District Court's denial of the writ should be affirmed. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 14 
III. If the Court Reaches the Merits, It Should Affirm the Secretary of 
State's Construction of" Elector" in Article III, § 6, to Mean a Qualified 
Elector, i.e., a Registered Voter 
Summary. The issue on the merits is whether an "elector" must be a registered voter. 
Mr. Hansen in effect argues that "elector" and "anyone who could legally register to vote but has 
not" mean the same thing; thus, if he were at least eighteen years old, a citizen, and a resident of 
Legislative District 19 for one year before the general election of 2014, he would be entitled to 
run for the Legislature.9 But this argument would re-write the Idaho Constitution in two places. 
First, it would effectively change the word "elector" in Article III, § 6 to "resident," even 
though the Framers decided by motion and vote to substitute the term "elector" for "inhabitant" 
in that section. Second, it would render the phrase, "if registered as provided by law," in Article 
VI, § 2, a nullity. Neither of these provisions should be amended, diminished, rendered super-
fluous, or nullified. Mr. Hansen's argument on the merits should be denied because the Framers 
of the Idaho Constitution crafted a practical balance between qualifications for the Legislature 
and elections officers' ability to verify the qualifications, namely requiring candidates to be 
registered voters for a year before the election. Accordingly, the Secretary of State asks this 
Court deny Mr. Hansen's appeal on the merits if it reaches the merits. 
A. Article III, § 6 Requires State Legislators to Have Been An Elector of Their District 
or County for One Year Preceding the Election 
The Appellant's Brief would have Mr. Hansen placed on the ballot without regard to the 
constitutional qualifications for a Legislator so long as he meets the statutory qualifications of 
Idaho Code § 34-614(2). App. Br., pp. 7, 22 ("no statute ... disqualified the Applicant"). The 
correct analysis begins with the Idaho Constitution. 
9 Mr. Hansen did not allege in the Application for a Writ, R., pp. 3-8, or in his Affidavit, pp. 15-16, 
that he had been and continued to be a resident of Legislative District 19 for at least one year before the 
general election of 2014. This failure of proof is another reason for ruling against him on the merits. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 15 
The "Court applies the rules of statutory construction to construe constitutional provi-
sions." Wasden v. State Bd. of Land Com 'rs, 153 Idaho 190, 196, 280 P.3d 693, 699 (2012). 
"Where a statute or constitutional provision is clear, the Court must follow the law as written 
and, thus, when the language is unambiguous, there is no occasion for application for rules of 
construction." Hayes v. Kingston, 140 Idaho 551, 553, 96 P.3d 652, 654 (2004). 
Two sections of the Idaho Constitution provide qualifications for the Legislature. Article 
III, § 6, requires citizenship and a year as an elector in the district to qualify for the Legislature: 
§ 6. Qualifications of members. - No person shall be a 
senator or representative who, at the time of his election, is not a 
citizen of the United States, and an elector of this state, nor anyone 
who has not been for one year next preceding his election, an 
elector of the county or district whence he may be chosen. 
Citizenship is a necessary condition to be in the Idaho Legislature, but it is not sufficient. Any 
person wishing to serve must also meet a second condition of local civic engagement: being an 
elector of his district for a year before the election. Perhaps Mr. Hansen is of the opinion that 
"Voter registration ... serves no purpose as a requirement to run for office, while causing harm to 
the state by creating a barrier for qualified legislative candidates," App.Br., p. 24, but the Fram-
ers of the Idaho Constitution thought otherwise. It is their thoughts that count. 
In turn, Article VI, § 2 defines electors - indeed, its title is "Qualifications of electors": 
§ 2. Qualifications of electors. - Every male or female 
citizen of the United States, eighteen years old, who has resided in 
this state and in the county where he or she offers to vote for the 
period of time provided by law, if registered as provided by law, is 
a qualified elector. 
This section has two requirements for a "qualified elector" in addition to age and citizenship: (1) 
residing in the county where he or she will vote for the time provided by law, and (2) not only 
residing in the county, but also being "registered as provided by law." 
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These two sections can be simply and easily read together. They require candidates for 
the Legislature to be citizens, to be at least eighteen years old, to be an elector of the county and 
the legislative district for one year before the general election, and to have been a registered 
elector during that time. These two provisions should be read together: 
[C]onstitutional provisions cannot be read in isolation, but must be 
interpreted in the context of the entire document. [They] must be 
read to give effect to every word, clause and sentence ... [w]e will 
not construe [them] in a way which makes mere surplusage of the 
provisions included therein ... ; [i]n construing the Constitution, ... 
provisions apparently in conflict must be reconciled if at all poss-
ible ... [t]hree sections of the Idaho Constitution, inasmuch as they 
relate to the same matter or subject, ... must be construed in pari 
materia. 
Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401, 403-404, 757 P.2d 664, 666-667 (1988) (citations and in-
ternal punctuation omitted). Thus, this Court should construe the phrase "if registered as 
provided by law" so as not to render it meaningless or surplusage. 
To be an elector, one must meet the qualifications of Article VI, § 2. A person who does 
not meet all them does not have the "qualifications of [an] elector." Giving effect to the words 
and clauses in Article VI, § 2, there are four requirements to be an elector under Article III, § 6: 
being (a) a citizen of the United States, (b) eighteen years old, (c) a resident of the county for the 
time period prescribed by law, and (d) registered to vote as provided by law for a year before the 
general election. Mr. Hansen was not an elector in District 18 for a year before the 2014 general 
election because he was not "registered as provided by law" for that time. Mr. Hansen could 
qualify as a candidate for the Legislature only if this Court renders the fourth requirement for 
electors - to be "registered as provided by law" - as surplusage. 
Registration regulates the right of suffrage; it likewise can regulate the right to run for 
office. Qualified electors must be registered to vote as provided by law, so the requirement that 
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members of the Legislature be electors "for one year next preceding his election" means they do 
not become electors until they have registered to vote as required by law. 
B. The Term "Elector" Replaced "Inhabitant" When Article III, § 6 Was Framed 
The debates of the Constitutional Convention support the plain meaning of the language: 
Article III, § 6 was intended to require more than residence as to qualify for the Legislature. 
During the convention, a draft of Article III, § 6 was debated and amended. Delegate Heyburn 
moved to amend Article III, § 6, to substitute the word "elector" for "inhabitant" just before the 
phrase "of the county or district." Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 
Idaho 1889, Vol. I, p. 506 (1912). Mr. Heyburn explained: 
The object of that is, that a man might not live in the county at all, 
he only needs to be an elector of this state and inhabitant of the 
county; inhabitant is not the term we should use, but a man who is 
going to be a candidate for the legislature should be an elector of 
the county and district he seeks to represent. 
Id. The motion carried, and "elector" replaced "inhabitant." Id. The Constitutional Convention 
clearly intended more than residency through this change in the wording in what would become 
Article III, § 6. This change prevented "carpetbagging" by requiring legislators to have an 
official connection to their districts for at least a year before the election, as opposed to a mere 
residence or inhabitance. Based upon this change in wording, "elector" in Article III, § 6, does 
not have the same meaning as "resident" or its synonym "inhabitant". 1° Cf Wright v. Willer, 111 
Idaho 4 7 4, 4 76, 725 P.2d 179, 181 (1986) (recognizing a distinction between statutory terms -
"moving" or "making" a motion and "filing" a motion). Similarly, the terms "resident" and 
"elector" do not have the same meaning, but instead must be recognized as terms involving 
10 "Inhabitant" and "resident" have similar meanings. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 
(1989) defines "inhabitant" as "one that occupies a particular place regularly, routinely, or for a period of 
time", p. 622, and "resident" as "1: one who resides in a place ... ," p. 1003. The corresponding definition 
of "reside" is "1 ... b: to dwell pennanently or continuously: occupy a place as one's legal domicile." Id. 
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discrete circumstances, particularly as residence is a qualification to be an elector. In other 
words, one must be a resident before one can be an elector, which makes the meaning of 
"resident" broader than the meaning of "elector." 
Being an elector requires a level of civic engagement and community involvement that 
exceeds merely residing in a district; the tenns "elector" and "resident" are far from synony-
mous. Choosing the term "elector" over the term "resident" or "inhabitant" at the Constitutional 
Convention shows the Framers' intent that candidates for the Legislature must have a degree of 
civic engagement via voter registration for at least one year before an election. 
C. The Constitution Provides Different Qualifications for Different Offices 
The Idaho Constitution's other sections for qualifications for office show that "elector" 
and "resident" have different meanings. The Framers used the terms "elector" and "resident" for 
specific purposes. For example, Article IV, § 3 requires that the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, 
Secretary of State, Controller, Treasurer, and Attorney General "shall be a citizen of the United 
States and shall have resided within the state or territory two years next preceding his election." 
In contrast, Article V, § 18 sets forth that the Prosecuting Attorney "shall be a practicing attorney 
at law, and a resident and elector of the county for which he is elected." (Emphasis added). 
Article V, § 23 requires that a District Judge "shall have resided in the state or territory at least 
two years next preceding his election, nor unless he shall have been at the time of his election, an 
elector in the judicial district for which he is elected." (Emphasis added). 
The Framers could have provided that Legislators merely reside in the district they rep-
resent, as they did for Executive officers'. Compare Art. III, § 6, with Art. IV, § 3. They did not. 
They chose, instead, to require a Legislator be an elector within the district for a year before his 
election, which is more than mere residency. The Framers also required Prosecuting Attorneys 
and District Judges to be residents in their counties or districts and to be electors, see Article V, 
RESP01'1DENT'S BRIEF - 19 
§ 18 and § 23, which shows that being an elector is more than being a resident. 
This Court should reject Mr. Hansen's implicit mvitation to revise the Idaho Constitution. 
A straightforward comparison of the constitutional sections outlining the qualifications for office 
shows that the Framers intended that a Legislator be qualified beyond mere residency. Mr. 
Hansen cannot show that he has met the constitutional qualifications to be an elector for the time 
required by law, based upon a plain reading of the Constitution. 
D. Idaho Code § 34-614 Cannot Limit Article III, § 6 
Mr. Hansen says: "No statute in Idaho Code disqualified the Applicant from holding the 
office of State Representative, or from being placed on the ballot for election to that office." 
App.Br., ,r 7, p. 22. He quotes Idaho Code § 34-614(2), which has a residency requirement, but 
no requirement to be an elector: 
(2) No person shall be elected to the office of representative 
or senator unless he shall have attained the age of twenty-one (21) 
years at the time of the general election, is a citizen of the United 
States and shall have resided within the legislative district one (1) 
year next preceding the general election at which he offers his 
candidacy. 
Be that as it may, the Legislature cannot amend or repeal any part of the Constitution by 
legislative act. State v. Village of Garden City, 74 Idaho 513,522,265 P.2d 328, 331-332 (1953). 
Therefore, the requirements of Idaho Code § 34-614 can add to, but cannot relax, those of Article 
III, § 6. The residency requirement of§ 34-614(2) cannot reduce or eliminate the constitutional 
requirement that a Legislator be an elector for a year prior to the election. 
E. "Elector" And "Qualified Elector" Mean the Same Thing in the Idaho Constitution 
Article VI, § 2 has been amended three times, but the phrase: "if registered as provided 
by law, is a qualified elector" has not changed since its adoption in 1890.11 The original 1890 
II See 1895 Idaho Session Laws (I.S.L.), S.J.R. No. 2 (extending franchise to women); 1961 l.S.L., 
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Idaho Constitution referred to voters as both electors and as qualified electors many times. 12 Just 
ten years after the Constitution's adoption, this Court said, "after a most careful examination of 
the several provisions of the constitution in which the terms 'elector' and 'qualified elector' are 
used, we conclude that said terms are used interchangeably and that an elector is a qualified 
elector." Wilson v. Bartlett, 7 Idaho 271,276, 62 P. 416,417 (1900). 
Wilson construed the term "elector" with respect to eligibility to sign a petition for 
removal of a county seat. Wilson noted that voters were then required to reregister every two 
years, and that county clerks were required to keep the registration lists for only one year. Id. at 
277-278, 62 P. at 418. How as a clerk to determine who was an elector during the one year gap 
when there were no voter registration records? Wilson explained that under those circumstances, 
"We do not think that registration is intended as one of the substantive qualifications of an 
elector. Registration was intended only as a regulation of the exercise of the right of suffrage, 
and not a qualification for such right." Id. Wilson held that registration was not "intended as one 
of the substantive qualifications of an elector" to avoid the following paradox: "If registration is 
S.J.R. No. 6 (providing limited franchise to recent residents to vote for President); 1982 I.S.L., H.J.R. 
No.14 (extending franchise to eighteen-year-olds, repealing obsolete rules for women who held office 
under Territorial laws, and moving durational residency requirements from Constitution to statute). 
12 The following sections refer to voters as "electors": Idaho Const. Art. III, § 2 (legislators are 
chosen by "electors"); Art. V, § 6 (Supreme Court justices are chosen by "electors of the state at large"); 
Art. XII, § 1 ("electors" may organize a city or town); Art. XX, §§ L 2 & 3 (submission of constitutional 
amendments to "electors"); Art. XXI, § 6 (submission of original Constitution to "electors"). 
The following sections refer to voters as "qualified electors": Idaho Const. Art. IV, § 2 (executive 
constitutional officers chosen by "qualified electors"); Art. V, § 11 (District Judges chosen by "qualified 
electors"); Art. V, § 18 (Prosecuting Attorneys chosen by "qualified electors"); Art. VI, § 2 (registered 
voters are "qualified electors"); Art. XVIII, § 2 ("qualified electors" may remove county seat); Art. 
XVIII, § 3 ("qualified electors" may divide county); Art. XXI, § 9 ("qualified electors" shall vote for 
State and district offices following Idaho's admission into Union). 
If "electors" and "qualified electors" do not have the same meaning, then Legislators and Supreme 
Court Justices would be chosen by one body of voters ("electors") while Executive Officers, District Jud-
ges, and Prosecuting Attorneys would be chosen by a different body of voters ("qualified electors"). That 
seems unlikely to have been the Framers' intent. 
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one of the qualifications of an elector, the registrar is prohibited from registering any person who 
has not theretofore been registered." Id at 276, 62 P. at 417. 
Wilson held that for purposes of signing a petition to move a county seat, registration was 
not required, and the terms "elector" and "qualified elector" were interchangeable. Wilson did 
not hold that one could vote or hold office as an elector without registering, simply that the 
signing of a petition to exercise one's constitutional right to petition for a change in county seat 
did not require registration at a time when clerks were under no obligation to have preserved 
voter registration records. 
F. Under Current Law Registration Is a Qualification to Become an Elector 
Kerley v. Wetherell, 61 Idaho 31, 96 P.2d 503 (1939), held: "[T]he constitutional defini-
tion of a 'qualified elector' includes registration as an element thereof, where the municipal or 
statutory law requires registration." Id at 41, 96 P.2d at 508. After this observation, Kerley 
limited the holding of Ff/Uson, noting that Wilson "is based upon an interpretation of the intention 
of the law there under consideration." Id. at 42, 96 P. at 508. Kerley held that signers of a 
referendum petition under a Boise City ordinance must be registered voters. "The legislature 
clearly has the power to make registration an essential element." Id. Kerley limited Wilson to its 
circumstances; it held that the Constitution required registration to be a qualified elector under 
Article VI, § 2, whenever registration was required by law. 
If we are correct in our conclusion that the words "qualified 
elector" as used in said section was intended to mean electors of 
Boise City who are registered as required by law, then it follows 
that only such a qualified elector can verify such a petition, and the 
names of signers on a referendum petition, not so verified, cannot 
be counted. 
Id at 42, 96 P. at 508. In this case, registration is required to vote for Legislative candidates, so 
it follows under Kerley that "electors" who run for the Legislature must be registered voters. 
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Dredge ,Mining Control - Yes!, Inc. v. Cenarrusa, 92 Idaho 480, 445 P.2d 655 (1968), ex-
plained the Court's holding in Kerley: "[I]n considering ... whether signers of an initiative 
petition ... were required to be registered electors in the city, [Kerley] held that registration was 
required." Id. at 482-83, 445 P.2d at 657-58. Dredge ~Mining held that to be qualified to sign an 
initiative petition, a person must be eligible to vote on the measure and thus must be registered. 
Id. at 482, 445 P.2d at 657. The Court further noted that if a person were not registered to vote, it 
would be impossible for a clerk to verify that the person met the qualifications to vote. Id. A 
similar analysis applies in this case. Absent registration, it would be impractical to determine 
how long legislative candidates have lived in the district as "electors". 
G If the Law Is Ambiguous, the Secretary of State's Pragmatic Interpretation of the 
Constitution Provides an Easily Verifiable Test of Ballot Eligibility 
The Secretary of State "is the chief election officer of this state, and it is his responsibility 
to obtain and maintain unifom1ity in the application, operation and interpretation of the election 
law." Idaho Code§ 34-201(1). If the Constitution is ambiguous regarding being an elector for a 
year before the general election, the Court may defer to or adopt his constitutional interpretation 
for the same reasons that it would defer to his interpretation of a statute or a rule: 
Where an agency interprets a statute or rule, this Court applies a 
four-pronged test to determine the appropriate level of deference to 
the agency interpretation. This Court must determine whether: (1) 
the agency is responsible for administration of the rule in issue; (2) 
the agency's construction is reasonable; (3) the language of the rule 
does not expressly treat the matter at issue; and ( 4) any of the 
rationales underlying the rule of agency deference are present. 
There are five rationales underlying the rule of deference: ( 1) that 
a practical interpretation of the rule exists; (2) the presumption of 
legislative acquiescence; (3) reliance on the agency's expertise in 
interpretation of the rule; ( 4) the rationale of repose; and ( 5) the 
requirement of contemporaneous agency interpretation. 
Duncan v. State Bd. of Accountancy, l 49 Idaho 1, 3, 232 P.3d 322, 324 (2010). 
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The Secretary of State is not an "agency" as described by Duncan; he is a constitutional 
officer. That is all the more reason that the Court may wish to give him deference. \Vhen he is 
carrying out duties assigned to him by statute as the State's chief election officer, including his 
"responsibility to obtain and maintain uniformity in the application, operation and interpretation 
of the election law," § 34-201 (1 ), the following paragraph explains that the Duncan reasons for 
deference to his interpretation of Idaho constitutional and statutory election law make sense. 
First, the Secretary of State is charged by law with being the State's chief election officer. 
Second, his construction of Article III, § 6's requirement to be an elector of the county or district 
for one year preceding the election is reasonable. Third, if there is an ambiguity in the law (and 
this portion of the Argument only applies if there is an ambiguity), the Secretary of State must 
resolve it to detennine who is eligible for the ballot. Fourth, three of the five rationales for 
deference are present: The Secretary of State's interpretation provides an easily administered 
solution to the practical problem of resolving whether a candidate for the Legislature has been an 
elector in the district for a year before the general election; potential and actual candidates have 
relied on the Secretary of State to administer access to the ballot fairly and transparently; and the 
Secretary of State has taken a uniform position for at least forty years. YsursaAff., ,r 3. Neither 
the third nor fifth rationales are present here because no one can now know if there was 
acquiescence by the Framers to this interpretation or what the Framers' practices were. 
To elaborate on the practical aspects of the Secretary of State's position, Article III, § 6's 
requirement that a legislative candidate be an elector of the district for one year prior to his or her 
election is easily checked if being an elector means being a registered voter. But what if being 
an elector merely requires residence? This is how the Idaho Code defines voting residence: 
34-107. "Residence" defined. - (1) "Residence," for 
voting purposes, shall be the principal or primary home or place of 
abode of a person. Principal or primary home or place of abode is 
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that home or place in which his habitation is fixed and to which a 
person, whenever he is absent, has the present intention of return-
ing after a departure or absence therefrom, regardless of the dura-
tion of absence. 
(2) In determining what is a principal or primary place of 
abode of a person the following circumstances relating to such 
person may be taken into account: business pursuits, employment, 
income sources, residence for income or other tax pursuits, resi-
dence of parents, spouse, and children, if any, leaseholds, situs of 
personal and real property, situs of residence for [the homestead 
property tax exemption], and motor vehicle registration. 
(3) A qualified elector who has left his home and gone into 
another state or territory or county of this state for a temporary 
purpose only shall not be considered to have lost his residence. 
( 4) A qualified elector shall not be considered to have 
gained a residence in any county or city of this state into which he 
comes for temporary purposes only, without the intention of 
making it his home but with the intention of leaving it when he has 
accomplished the purpose that brought him there. 
(5) If a qualified elector moves to another state, or to any 
of the other territories, with the intention of making it his perma-
nent home, he shall be considered to have lost his residence in this 
state. 
Section 34-107's definition of voting "residence" shows the difficulty that the Secretary 
of State would have in determining the residence of Legislative candidates if voter registration 
records did not dispose of the issue of being an elector. If there were a challenge to a would-be 
candidate's residence in the district for a year before the election, the Secretary of State might 
have to examine his or her business pursuits, employment, income sources, residence for income 
or other tax pursuits, residence of other family members, if any, leaseholds, situs of personal and 
real property, homestead exemption, and motor vehicle registration to determine residency. How 
unworkable that would be! Instead, voter registration records provide a bright-line rule of law 
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that is easily administered. If the Court detem1ines that Constitution and statutes regarding being 
an elector for a year before the election are ambiguous, it may defer to or adopt the Secretary of 
State's practical administration of the issue. 
H. There Was No Record in the District Court Upon Which to Bring an Equal 
Protection Challenge 
Mr. Hansen states that the Secretary of State "has not claimed to have disqualified a 
single incumbent legislator from running for or holding office by the same legal theory ... which 
strongly suggests that the law may not have been applied equally to incumbent candidates and 
non-incumbent candidates alike." App.Br., p. 8. He adds: "There is a systematic barrier to new 
candidates running for legislature that is not applied to incumbents. This barrier is created ... by 
the inconsistent manner in which the Secretary of State is enforcing the law." Id., p. 26. 
Mr. Hansen's unsubstantiated implications, nay accusations, that the Secretary of State 
has applied one standard to challengers and another to incumbents are beyond the pale. There is 
nothing in the record to support them. Mr. Hansen has challenged the Secretary of State's inte-
grity with not a shred of evidence to support his challenge. That ends this discussion. Saying 
more would dignify scurrility. 
CONCLUSION 
The Secretary of State asks this Court: 
(1) Not to dismiss the appeal as moot, but to consider it under the following exceptions to 
the mootness doctrine: (a) the appeal presents issues capable of repetition but evading review, 
and/or (b) the appeal presents issues of substantial public importance. 
(2) To affirm the District Court's dismissal of the case below and to hold (a) there was no 
timely appeal from the Secretary of State's decision, (b) the time for appeal from the Secretary of 
State's decision was not extended by attempts to seek administrative remedies before the 
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Attorney General, and ( c) mandamus was not available against the Secretary of State following 
the failure to file a timely appeal from the Secretary of State's decision. 
(3) If the Court reaches the merits, to affirm the Secretary of State's construction of the 
Idaho Constitution and to hold that the Secretary of State properly construed Article III, § 6, and 
Article VI, § 2, of the Idaho Constitution by determining that every person who would serve as a 
member of the Idaho Legislature must have been a registered voter in his or her county or his or 
her district for one year preceding the ge~er!J:lection. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this :::.:, day of December, 2014. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEJ\.,TERAL 
By/J))4U4/j, 
MICHAELS. GILMORE 
Deputy Attorney General 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 27 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i 
.;, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this , ., day of December, 2014, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
Caleb Hansen 
280 North 8th St., Apt. #306 
Boise, ID 83702 
[}G.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: 
D Email: caleb@apsboise.com 
IJJ?44JlJlJ~ 
MICHAELS. GILMORE 
Deputy Attorney General 
RESPONTIENT'S BRIEF - 28 
